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29 October 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



[Redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

*USSR: Moscow has moved quickly to dramatize Khrushchev's 28 October offer to dismantle the Soviet bases in Cuba under UN supervision as a major step in guaranteeing world peace.

Khrushchev's reference to US assurances against an invasion of Cuba is being highlighted in Soviet domestic propaganda in an apparent effort to convince the Soviet audience that unilateral US action was averted by the Soviet Premier's move. The Soviet leader's message carried no hint of any demand for reciprocal concessions elsewhere, but did urge the US to exercise restraint in other areas.

Khrushchev's indication that the USSR wishes to take up negotiations with the US on broader international issues was reiterated by Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on his arrival last night in New York. Reflecting the USSR's intention to re-establish its prestige, Kuznetsov declared that Moscow intends to resolve outstanding international problems through negotiations. Neither the Soviet Premier nor Kuznetsov mentioned Berlin, suggesting that for the time being at least Moscow intends to play this issue in low key.

The Communist bloc's initial treatment of the US-Soviet exchange reflects the impact the Soviet back-down is bound to have on the USSR's position as leader of the bloc. East European press and radio comment

points to a reiteration of Moscow's theme that Khrushchev deserves "personal credit" for preserving the peace, while linking the Soviet decision entirely to President Kennedy's assurances not to invade Cuba.

While Peiping has broadcast a brief report of Khrushchev's letter to the President, it has offered no comment, and the Chinese have given little indication that the crisis has lessened. Peiping is the only bloc capital to have broadcast Castro's public statement, issued after Khrushchev's 28 October message, in which the Cuban leader demanded the withdrawal of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo.

The USSR apparently did not coordinate its move with Castro. Aside from Castro's brief reference, Havana has not commented publicly on Khrushchev's message. Similarly, Moscow has not commented on Castro's statement. While the Soviet Union has declared its willingness to withdraw its missile bases, it probably will continue support of Castro and provide sufficient economic aid to help him maintain his regime.

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***USSR:** Top Soviet leaders made a mass public appearance at an evening theater performance in Moscow on 28 October, probably in an attempt to symbolize that the Cuban crisis has not divided their ranks. This was the first time they had gathered publicly since 23 October.

Nonetheless, Khrushchev's retreat on Cuba is likely to produce new strains in the Soviet leadership. The military buildup in Cuba was quite clearly Khrushchev's own policy, and while the policy seems to have collective endorsement, the reversal will be blamed largely on Khrushchev personally.

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
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India - Communist China: (The most important battle to date is shaping up for control of the strategic pass at Se La along the road eastward from Tawang, where Peiping's biggest effort is being made.)

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Reinforced Indian troops continue to parry Chinese thrusts at several other points along the border. [] outnumbered Indian forces have given ground only when their ammunition ran out, again pointing up Indian logistic difficulties.)

About 15,000 additional Indian troops have been or are now being moved to the northeast frontier. These forces will probably bring Indian strength in the area near the 36,000 which Indian military estimates in 1961 considered necessary to hold the North East Frontier Agency against the Chinese.)

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Pakistan's President Ayub has assured Ambassador McConaughy that his government would take no action which would hamper the Indians in their struggle with the Chinese. He rejected any possibility of a message of support to New Delhi, however, as neither necessary nor helpful in improving the Indian military position.)

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*France: (De Gaulle's failure to win the backing of half the electorate in yesterday's referendum will give new heart to the traditional political parties and encourage them to make an all-out drive against Gaullist candidates in the late November elections for the National Assembly.)

Although De Gaulle's proposal to have future presidents elected by popular vote was supported by nearly 62 percent of those voting, almost 23 percent of the eligible voters stayed away from the polls. The "yes" vote totaled less than 47 percent of the eligible electorate.)

Opponents of De Gaulle will consider they have won a moral victory, and some probably will increase pressure for a move to challenge the legality of the referendum. Most of the political leaders, however, will likely be satisfied to use the issue in the campaign for the assembly elections on 18 and 25 November.)

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